Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes
Unbound: The Political Consequences
of Reapportionment
Ward Elliottj

[1]n those momentous days the French nation committed a
deadly crime against democracy, which, on its knees, now
utters the daily prayer: "Holy Universal Suffrage, pray for
us!" Naturally enough, the believers in universal suffrage will
not renounce their faith in a wonder-working power which has
performed such great miracles on their behalf, which has
transferred the second Bonaparte into a Napoleon, Saul into
Paul, and Simon into Peter. The folk-spirit speaks to them
through the ballot boxes as the god of the prophet Ezekiel
spoke to the dry bones: "Haec dicit dominus deus ossibus
suis: Ecce ego intromittam in vos Spiritum et vivetis."
-KARL MARX'

Citizens should be given the blessings of equality whether
they want them or not.
-ANDREw

I.

HACKER2

THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED

With the Reapportionment Revolution now in its ninth year, it is
possible to attempt a preliminary assessment of its political accomplish-

ments. In 1962 it was conventional wisdom among the cognoscenti,
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1 Marx's quote is from the first edition of his 181H BRumAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE,
deleted from subsequent editions but quoted in J. P. Mayer, ed., Introduction to THE
RECOLLECrIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEviLLE at xx-xxi (1949).
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Gordon Baker, Anthony Lewis, Andrew Hacker, Robert McKay, John
F. Kennedy, the Twentieth Century Fund, and the American Political
Science Association, that Malapportionment8 was to blame for the
worst problems of government at every level. It was supposed to have
reduced city dwellers to second-class citizens, and to have stifled urgently
needed reforms like home rule, slum clearance, metropolitan transit,
annexation, labor and welfare legislation, civil rights laws, equal tax
laws, and equal expenditures on schools and roads "because of the
ignorance and indifference of rural legislators." Besides giving special
powers to rural intransigents, Malapportionment was supposed to
weaken federalism by splitting party control of legislatures and governorships, stopping government action and spawning "public cynicism,
disillusionment, and apathy." Reapportionment was supposed to destroy the rural roadblock, unshackle the cities, unleash the bottled-up
legislation, strengthen local and state representation, and produce a
"new breed of legislator" as well.4
Yet Prometheus unchained seems remarkably unchanged, either in
the matter of banishing public cynicism, disillusionment, and apathy
or of producing an urban tyranny, as Strom Thurmond had feared.
Such changes as did take place seem more directly connected with
political upheavals like the Democratic landslide of 1964 or the Republican gains of 1966-68 than with reapportionment. Studies by Andrew
Hacker and the Congressional Quarterly based on pre-reapportionment
data showed no connection between unequal districts and Congress'
reluctance to pass liberal, administration-backed legislation.5 If anything, according to Hacker's weighting of sample roll calls, reapportionment could be expected to produce greater resistance to such measures.
The most noted casualty of reapportionment in Congress was House
Rules Committee Chairman Howard W. Smith, a conservative, who
lost to his moderate opponent, George C. Rawlings, Jr., by 645 votes
in the 1966 Virginia primary after his district had been redrawn. The
net effect of this change was to introduce a New Breed of Congressman
3 Perhaps the greatest victory of the proponents of reapportionment was the public
acceptance of the term "malapportionment" even by opponents of reapportionment.
The term is handy, but loaded, describing all inequality of districts-which can be good
or bad depending on its political context-as "bad apportionment." I have capitalized
it in the hope of retaining the shorthand but warning against the implicit and gratuitous
moral judgment.
4 See G. BAKER, RURAL VERsus URBAN POLITICAL PowER 4, 27-39 (1955); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, ONE MAN-ONE VOTE (1962); Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1063 (1958); Kennedy, The Shame of the States,
N.Y. Times, May 18, 1958 (Magazine), at 12.
5 See 20 CONG. Q. WEEKLY Rm'. 153-4 (Feb. 2, 1962); CONG. Q. CENSus ANALYsIS,
1784-99 (Aug. 21, 1964); A. HACKER, CONcrssioNAL DISTRICTING, supra note 2, at 97.
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in one district and that only with the help of a general trend toward
new faces in Virginia politics, itself more connected with the revolt
against the Byrd machine than with reapportionment. There was little
change in the governance of the Rules Committee, since Smith was
succeeded by another southern conservative, William M. Colmer of
Mississippi.
In the states there were many changes, often quite dramatic ones, in
regional control of legislatures, and some individual changes in policy
in which reapportionment may have been a secondary factor; however,
no overall trend of policy attributable to reapportionment can yet be
perceived. On the basis of the Congressional Quarterly's August 1966
survey of reapportionment6 it seems reasonable to conclude that control shifted from one region to another in the legislatures of five states;
Florida, where the fast-growing southern half of the state broke the
northern half's traditional domination of the legislature after a bitter
eighteen year struggle; Alabama, where power in the state senate was
transferred from the agricultural south to the industrial north; Maryland, where the balance of power seemed to have shifted from the east
shore, southern and western Maryland to the suburbs of Baltimore
and Washington, and to Baltimore itself; California, where power
shifted from north to south; and Nevada, where Reno and Las Vegas
(and Howard Hughes?) now control the legislature formerly dominated
by rural interests. In five western states with regionally apportioned
senates-Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Missouri-reapportionment brought radical augmentation of urban power in one
house. Cities in Vermont, Chicago, and the central Piedmont cities of
North Carolina (Charlotte, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Raleigh)
likewise gained substantially in their respective state senates. Georgia,
Delaware, Texas, Kansas, Washington, and Michigan cities and suburbs
made very substantial gains in both houses, such as to give them a good
prospect of controlling the legislatures after the 1970 census if they do
not control them already. Apart from these 19 states, reapportionment
has not brought radical alterations in regional balances of power. Even
in Tennessee, whose "crazy quilt" of unequal districts had inspired the
Court to intervene in Baker v. Carr7 the inequalities had been so haphazard that reapportionment does not seem to have brought about any
major alterations in regional influence within the state.
Even where there were important changes in the balance of power,
the New Breed of legislator looks more like Proteus than Prometheus,
6 CONGRESSIONAL

QUARTERLY

BACKGROUND

REPORT, REPRESENTATION
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passim, but especially 45-50, 62-93 (1966) (hereinafter cited as CQ).
7 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962) (Clark, J. concurring).
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with new policies much less responsive to reapportionment than to
other influences. In Michigan and Vermont, the New Breed followed
George Romney and Philip Hoff; but in California it followed Ronald
Reagan; in Florida it followed Claude Kirk; in Georgia, Lester Maddox; in Alabama, Lurleen Wallace. Can this be what Gordon Baker
and the Twentieth Century Fund had in mind? After the Johnson landslide of 1964, reapportionists pointed to signs that the great breakthrough had come (although only five states had reapportioned in time
for the 1964 elections). In Colorado, for example, though party control
of the legislature was divided, counter to the reapportionists' script,
the reapportioned legislature did appropriate more money for education, especially in Denver and suburbs, passed a dog leash law, an annexation law, a birth control law, and an abortion law; it provided for
referenda on daylight savings and abolition of the death penalty, amid
the usual reapportionist hoots that " 'the rural bloc' " had "'sat on
the lid too long.' "8 The same kind of activity was going on all over the
country, with reapportioned Vermont,9 Delaware, 10 Michigan," and
Iowa' 2 passing all sorts of welfare and civil rights legislation thitherto
"'bottled-up"-along with the unreapportioned United States Congress,
which passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, both stalled under Kennedy, and the Malapportioned California legislature which had passed the Rumford Fair Housing Act in
1963 only to have it repealed by referendum in 1964.13 Negroes appeared
in the reapportioned Georgia legislature in 1965 for the first time since
1907 and in Virginia and Alabama after the 1966 elections-but not in
Mississippi, which lagged far behind the other southern states in registration of Negro voters. Hubert Humphrey spoke for almost all the
experts when he told the National Legislators Leaders Conference that
"Reapportionment has brought new life, new vigor to state government." 14
But was it reapportionment? Or was it that the conservatives had been
walloped at the polls in 1964 and that 1965 was the Year of Civil
Rights? Was it equal districts which brought the New Breed of legislator to Iowa and Colorado or the national Democratic landslide? Was
8 R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONmENT: THE LAw AND PoLiTIcs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION
268 (1965); see Dines, A Reapportioned State, 55 NAT. Civic REV. 70 (1966).
9 Bryan, Who is Legislating?, 56 NAT. Civic REv. 627 (1967).

10 McKAY, supra note 8, at 269.
11 Id.; Note, Reapportionment,79 HARv. L. REV. 1228, 1240 (1966).

12 CQ at 41-42.

1s Proposition 14, which was the provision repealing the Rumford Act, was later
declared unconstitutional as violative of the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 869 (1967).
14 CQ at 41.
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it the "Fundamental Principle of the Constitution"'u that revitalized
federalism in Michigan and Vermont, or was it George Romney and
Philip Hoff? Were the Negro legislators in Georgia and Alabama a
product of redistricting or of doubled Negro registration since the

1950's. Public apathy, disillusionment, and cynicism indeed seemed
much diminished in the states in the middle sixties, exactly as the reapportionists had foretold, but the suspicion waxed as the decade waned
that the optimism of those days was a product of popular fashion, not
the fruit of Reynolds v. Sims.'16
Much cold water has flowed over the dam since the Year of Civil
Rights. The Republican-conservative resurgence in the elections of
1966 replaced moderate Democratic governors like Pat Brown of California, Carl Sanders of Georgia, and Haydon Burns of Florida, with
conservatives like Ronald Reagan, Lester Maddox, and Claude Kirk,
while perpetuating the Wallace dynasty in Alabama. The Michigan legislature lost some of its lustre when some of the New Breed were
charged with soliciting a Michigan State University coed for immoral
purposes, repeated drunken driving arrests, wife-beating and nonpayment of federal income taxes."1 Senate Democratic leader Raymond D.
Dzendzel of Detroit was criticized for accepting an electric wristwatch
8
as a gift from a lobbyist after he steered a watchmaker's bill into law.'
California's first reapportioned legislature, though controlled by Democrats in both houses, cooperated with Republican Governor Ronald
Reagan in slashing mental health expenditures and cutting back educational expansion. Colorado's second election of the New Era was "dull,
9
uninspired, and ignored by large numbers of voters,"' and it resulted,
like many 1966 elections, in the ouster of many of the new Democrats
of 1964. Reapportionists and others watching the cities for the expected Revitalization since reapportionment saw little sign of it; instead, every passing year seemed to show the cities and states less capable
of dealing with their own problems; with the yoke of Malapportionment thrown off, the cities' political efflorescence expressed itself in
riots and garbage strikes, and the New Federalism seemed to consist
of appeals to the federal government for troops and money, if anything,
more than the old.
National, state, and local elections in 1968 and 1969 continued the
15 "[T]he fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one
of equal representation for equal numbers of people ... " Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
560-1 (1964).
16 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17 CQ at 41.
18 Id.
19

McBride, The 1966 Election in Colorado, 20

WEsMRN POL.

Q. 555 (1967).
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trend away from the civil rights euphoria of 1965, with the most dramatic rebuffs of the liberals taking place in the cities themselves. All three
Presidential candidates in the 1968 campaign vowed to bring back
law and order, with the winner, Richard Nixon, promising to bring
back a Supreme Court of strict constructionists. The Republicans held
onto their gains of 1966 in Congress and added to them in the states.
In the cities conservative mayors like Sam Yorty of Los Angeles and
Richard Daley of Chicago survived strong challenges from the liberals,
while liberal mayors dropped like flies. Four liberal mayors, Joseph
Barr of Pittsburgh, Jerome Cavanaugh of Detroit, Richard C. Lee of
New Haven, and Arthur Naftalin of Minneapolis withdrew from electoral politics by their own choice. New York City liberals Robert
Wagner and John Lindsay succumbed to lesser-known conservative
rivals in their own party primaries. In Minneapolis moderate candidates
of both parties lost to an ex-policeman, Charles Stenvig, running on
the law and order ticket. George Wallace, surveying the New Breed of
mayor, vintage 1968-69, was not wholly unjustified in claiming vindication in the cities of the hard-line conservatism he had pressed in the
1968 Presidential campaign. "My vote was only the tip of the iceberg,"
said Wallace. "There's others I'm responsible for: Stenvig, Mayor Yorty
of Los Angeles, two mayoral candidates in New York. They were making
Alabama speeches with a Minneapolis, Los Angeles and New York
accent. The only thing they omitted was the drawl." 20 The first four
years since the great reapportionment of 1965-66 are a short basis on
which to judge, but the swift change in the mood of government from
the Year of Civil Rights to the Year of Law and Order has done very
little to vindicate the experts of 1962.
Shortly after Reynolds v. Sims quantitative studies began to appear
in the professional press, comparing indicators of Malapportionment
in the various states with indicators of the various evils-suppression
of party competition, split governments, inadequate welfare legislation,
and budgetary discrimination against the cities-which Malapportionment was supposed to produce.2' Although these studies included the
southern states, where all of these indicators except split governments
20 NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1969, at 65.
21 Jacob, The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution, 43 Soc.
FoRcas 256 (1964); Dye, Malapportionmentand Public Policy in the States, 27 J. Pomcs
586 (1965); Alvin D. Sokolow, After Reapportionment: Numbers or Policies? (1966)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author); Hofferbert, The Relation Between
Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States,
60 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 73 (1966); see D. LocKmmw, THE POLrrcs OF STATE AND LocAL
GovERr 319 (1963) (finding Massachusetts legislature with cities overrepresented no
more responsive to urban needs than Connecticut, where cities were underrepresented).
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are common, they showed little sign of a relationship between Malapportionment and its claimed effects. The technique of the studies
was to rank the states in order of Malapportionment prior to Baker v.
Carr, then rank them according to level of party competition, frequency
of divided government, distribution of state funds between urban and
rural users, and level of expenditures for welfare, then see whether
there was any relationship between the rank orders. Herbert Jacob tried
three measurements of malapportionment: population ratio between
the largest and smallest districts, Dauer-Kelsay scores of minimum population necessary to control a majority, and the David-Eisenberg index
of "voting power" by county.22 Thomas Dye chose the Schubert-Press I
index for his ranking of the states, allowing for skewness, kurtosis, and
joint variability23 along with the Dauer-Kelsay and David-Eisenberg
rankings. Richard I. Hofferbert chose the Schubert-Press II index,
corrected for floterial districts as well as the other factors. 24 These
analysts picked different indicators for "liberal" welfare policies and
budgetary favoritism, with Jacob relying on old age assistance, per capita
health expenditures, and highway fund distribution, and Dye choosing
school per-pupil expenditures, teacher's salary, teacher-pupil ratio (as
well as welfare expenditures) and tax structure, while Hofferbert reckoned from per-pupil aid to local education, per-recipient aid to the
aged, the blind, and the unemployed, per-family aid to dependent
children, and direct state aid to the state's two largest cities. Alvin
D. Sokolow used three derivatives of the David-Eisenberg index and
chose highway and education grants and municipal annexation laws for
his policy variables. Though the rank indicators of the different studies
were not always the same, the results of comparison between policy
ranking and apportionment ranking failed in almost every case to show
a substantial connection between Malapportionment and its supposed
policy results. California ranked fortieth on Hofferbert's apportionment
scale, but third on his welfare orientation scale; Maine was seventh in
apportionment but thirty-sixth in welfare. Only one of the five different
standards of Malapportionment used showed any relationship with
party competition ranking, and that was very low. 25 None of the ap22 Jacob, Consequences of Malapportionment,supra note 21, at 257-8.
23 Dye, Malapportionmentand Public Policy, supra note 21, at 588-90.
24 Hofferbert, Structural Variables, supra note 21, at 74. Schubert-Press I and II indices
are from Schubert and Press, Measuring Malapportionment, 58 Ar. POL. Scr. REv. 02
(1964) (1), revised to correct for floterial districts, id. at 966-70 (Ii).
25 Dye, Malapportionment and Public Policy, supra note 21, at 594. Alvin D. Sokolow
found urban underrepresentation "slightly to moderately" related to highway and
education grants and municipal annexation laws, but found that the highway grant
correlation, when corrected for road mileage, dropped "almost to 0." He also pointed out

that the aid to education figures did not deal with a specific state policy but measured
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portionment scales showed a relationship between unequal districts
and governments with split party control.
Neither these studies nor the experiences of the states since reapportionment prove the reapportionists wrong; the experience of the states
has been very short, and the studies are limited by the clumsiness of
their various standards of apportionment, by their inclusive aggregation
of different political systems which are not wholly commensurable, and
by their time frame, which was largely restricted to the decade just
before Baker v. Carr. Better data and techniques of analysis might give
a different picture for individual states and other times. But the available evidence seems more than sufficient to put the reapportionists' expectations of a great revitalization of state and local government into a
more realistic perspective which should rank reapportionment as a
trivial political influence compared to such traditional forces as parties,
personalities, interest groups, and the perversities of popular fashion.
II.

REAPPORTIONMENT

AND

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Now that the Reapportionment Revolution has been substantially
won, reapportionists can afford to concede that they might have exaggerated a trifle in claiming that reapportionment would free the
cities, liberalize policies, unplug bottlenecks in government, etc.; at
least, they say, it has strengthened federalism and implemented the
Fundamental Principle of the Constitution by securing equal representation for equal numbers. But has it? An honest answer would have
to be yes, but no. Reapportionment has done a great deal to equalize
representation in states like Florida, Alabama, California, Nevada, and
Maryland, where unequal districts did disfranchise regions with population majorities; it has helped undermine white, one-party government
the amount of funds received by counties from a number of different sources for a
number of different purposes. It was therefore not as meaningful as the other indicators.
Sokolow, After Reapportionment, supra note 21, at Tables 1 & 2. He did show, however,
that five states with density and minimum mileage provisions in their aid to school transport scored only 50.2 average on the large county vote value index, while 15 states without

these provisions (which limited state aid to city schools) scored an average of 73.5. Id. at
Table 3. Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, in a 1968 study, used a regression
model to correlate social and political data related to Malapportionment-apparently
without controlling for the southern states-and concluded that within the "confining
methodological procedure" chosen "it is possible to accept the hypotheses that malapportionment tends to depress and party competition tends to elevate some of the more
important categories of state and local governmental expenditure."
"[W]e do feel strongly," they cautioned, "that a study much more ambitious than
ours, or than those which have reached conclusions dissimilar to ours, is required before
definitive answers to questions such as those we have explored ought to be offered."
Pulsipher & Weatherby, Malapportionment Party Competition, and the Function
Distribution of Governmental Expenditures, 62 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 1207, 1219 (1968).
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in the Deep South; it has corrected blatant discrimination against large
sectors of the populations of a dozen or so states besides the five worst
examples mentioned, and it has corrected more minor forms of discrimination in the rest of the country. But the Court has not made
these corrections in a thoroughgoing or discerning way, except in the
narrow sense of exacting strict adherence to its rule of equal districts
as its best strategy for securing compliance without venturing into the
quagmire. Because of the onesided and Procrustean character of the
Court's intervention against Malapportionment, substantial questions
remain as to whether the Reapportionment Revolution promoted equal
representation in most of the states.
The Court's meddling with structural biases favoring one group or
another was highly selective, for the best of tactical reasons: attacking
the more subtle forms of structural discrimination would have raised
the standards problem and landed the Court in the quagmire. The
Court could abolish Malapportionment, which favored rural voters,
but it could do nothing about bloc voting, multi-member districts,
strategic majorities, and other structural biases which favored the
cities. Nor could it reach gerrymanders except to make sure they were
all the same size. In some cases this was an important restriction. In
1962, for example, Democrats in California and Republicans in Michigan and New York had successfully gerrymandered districts in their
respective states; with stricter adherence to equal districts in New York,
the Republicans picked up fewer extra seats. 26 As a general rule, however, it appears that gerrymandering has been little hampered by having
to work within equal districts. Robert J. Sickels examined ten congressional elections from 1946 to 1964 in siates susceptible to gerrymandering; that is, with more than one district and a dominant party
in the legislature with power to gerrymander. Comparing the votes received by the party with districting power with the median/mean
average of its seats won, Sickels found that the power to gerrymander
conveyed a striking advantage of 11 to 17 per cent extra seats. With
50 to 55 per cent of the total state congressional votes, the party with
districting power won 67/69.8 per cent of the seats; the party without
districting power, also with 50 to 55 per cent of the total vote, won
only 50/58 per cent of the seats. 27 No overall relationship could be
found between equality of districts and effectiveness of the gerrymandering; in fact,
In the great majority of states with congressional gerryman26
27

20 CoNG. Q. WEuLy REP. 2163, 2165-7 (Nov. 16, 1962).
Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?,

75 YA=- L.J. 1300, 1303 (1966); double figures are median/mean percentages of seats won.
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ders, unequal district size either has not affected the gerrymander or has made it less effective
than it would have been
28

had the districts been equal.

III. A GERRYMANDERING REVOLUTION?
How can one explain Sickels' findings? Two theories come at once
to mind: a gerrymander, to be effective, must be kept up to date, and
nothing offers itself so readily to redrawing gerrymanders as reapportionment. The same population shifts which caused unequal districts
could also render the most skillfully drawn gerrymander obsolete. Yet
in normal circumstances legislators prefer stable districts and safe seats
to districts which are constantly being redrawn to follow population
shifts, no matter whether the redrawing is intended to equalize the
districts or to maximize the power of one party or one interest. The
balance of political motives in most legislatures frustrated radical redistricting of any kind; wedded to the status quo, it frustrated reapportionment and gerrymandering alike.
Radical reapportionment overrides a legislature's instinct for leaving
the districts alone yet leaves unchecked the normal disposition of legislators to consult their own interests. A majority party which is compelled to redraw its districts can be expected to draw them to its own
advantage, as minority parties and groups across the country found to
their discomfiture, for there is every reason to believe that the Reapportionment Revolution brought with it something which none of the
experts had thought of-a Gerrymandering Revolution. Perhaps the
most striking indicator of gerrymandering in the course of reapportionment was the profusion of grotesque districts which the mapmakers
of the 1960's left behind. Texas legislators set up a district 250 miles
long and one county wide for much of its length for Congressman
Olin E. Teague.2 9 Colorado's Fourth Congressional District stretched
400 miles diagonally across the state from the Nebraska border in the
northeast to the southwestern tip of the state where it borders Utah,
Arizona, and New Mexico. 30 New York's 148th Assembly District was
43 miles long, taking a slice of Rochester, continuing through the towns
of Greece, Parma, and Hamlin, and then stretching 24 miles into Orleans County; the 153d District was laid out in two sections separated
by three towns and two other districts. 31 A three-judge federal court
invalidated New York's congressional apportionment of 1961, describ28

Id. at

1300.

3 (city ed.).
CQ at 87.
In re Orans Petition, 45 Misc. 2d. 616, 652, 257 N.Y.S.2d 839, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1965).

20 N.Y. Times, May 25, 1967, at
30
31
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ing the wild contortions of four Brooklyn districts as "bizarre." 32 A
North Carolina federal court invalidated a congressional apportionment
plan whose districts varied no more than 8.9 per cent from average because of the "tortuous lines" of districts drawn to protect incumbents. 33
Cities and urban minority groups who had hoped to profit from reapportionment found themselves instead cut to pieces and tacked on to
districts of different political makeup. In Texas, Dallas-Fort Worth and
San Antonio were divided into eight districts, four of which were tied
to expanded rural districts.3 4 Memphis, 35 Kansas City, Kansas, 3 6 Wichita,37 Oldahoma City,38 and Newark3 9 were likewise dismembered. Elizabeth, the county seat of Union County, New Jersey, was detached and
joined to Hudson County on the other side of Newark Bay.40 Negro
communities in Boston and New York City were divided and the pieces
parceled out to districts with white majorities; 41 urban Negroes in Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia protested their submersion in specially
43
created multi-member districts. 42 Partisan minorities in Hawaii,
44
Iowa, New Mexico, 4 5 and Pennsylvania4 6 also complained of submersion in multi-member districts or at-large elections.
The reader should be extremely suspicious of a bare listing of distorted districts and constituents' complaints to support the theory that
reapportionment has brought with it a wave of gerrymandering. Reapportionists used just such isolated and subjective evidence to support
their dubious doctrine of the rural roadblock, and it has not held up
well under closer examination. A better case for a connection, whether
positive or negative, between reapportionment and gerrymandering
would require techniques like those of Robert Sickels, comparing the
ratio of votes won to seats won by parties with and without districting
power, in elections before and after reapportionment. 47 If one could
32 N.Y. Times, May 11, 1967, at 1 (city ed.).
33 CQ at 57.

34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.

87

at 89.

Id.

38 26 CONG. Q. WrKLY REP. 22 (Jan. 5, 1968).
39 Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 222 A.2d 101 (1966).
4o Id.
41 N.Y. Times, March 29, 1967, at 38.
42 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42, af'g per
curiam Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1965); CQ at 25.
43 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
44 CQ at 25.
45 Hatheway, Political Gerrymanders, 86 G. WASH. L. REv. 144, 148 (1967).
46 Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S.

40 (1964).
47 Sickels, supra note 27.
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show that parties controlling reapportionment won more seats per vote
than parties that did not, one could have a substantial indicator of the
overall effectiveness of the power to gerrymander since reapportionment; the results could then be compared with those of pre-reapportionment elections to see whether reapportionment has encouraged or
discouraged effective gerrymandering-though even this kind of examination would show very little about racial, ethnic, and other forms of
nonparty gerrymandering.
Ideally, such a study would be addressed to state legislatures and
cover several elections since reapportionment to avoid sampling error.
Although detailed information on federal Congressional elections is
much easier to get than information on state elections, federal elections involve fewer districts than state elections and are more likely to
produce sampling error. Moreover, Congressional districts have always
been subject to an external inter-state reapportionment requirement
under article I, section 2, 48which may obscure the effects of the intrastate reapportionment requirement of Wesberry v. Sanders.4 9 Unfortunately, however, the states do not usually circulate detailed election
results, and at this writing50 few of them have had more than two or
three post-apportionment elections.
The returns of the 1966 and 1968 Congressional elections, however,
suggest very strongly that parties with reapportionment power have
used it to enormous advantage. In Kansas' 1965 reapportionment, for
instance, the Republicans were ordered to redraw district boundaries to
equalize the districts. They saw no reason not to draw the new boundaries to their own advantage and therefore split Sedgwick and Wyandotte Counties (Wichita and Kansas City) in two to strengthen their
hold on two otherwise competitive districts."' By so doing, they were
able to win four out of Kansas' five seats in Congress: 80 per cent of
the seats for only 57.3 per cent of the vote, for a winner's extra margin
of 22.7 per cent. By contrast, Oregon Republicans, who had 51.7 per
cent of the popular vote but had not controlled the districting, won
only two of Oregon's four seats for a popular winner's margin of minus
1.7 per cent. A similar contrast may be drawn between North Carolina
and Minnesota. North Carolina Democrats controlled the districting
in 1966 and won 72.7 per cent of the seats with 59 per cent of the votes
in 1966, a winner's margin of 13.7 per cent. Minnesota Democrats did
not control the districting of 1961. In 1966, with 50.1 per cent of the
48 "Representatives . .. shall be apportioned among the several States...
U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2.
49 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
50 Early 1970.
51 24 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2049 (Sept. 16, 1966). The Republicans swept all five
Kansas congressional districts in the 1966 and 1968 elections.
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votes, they won only 38 per cent of the seats, a margin of minus 12.1
per cent.
If these examples were representative, they would indicate that the
power to gerrymander gave its possessor a crushing 25 per cent advantage
over nonpossessors who were also able to secure popular majorities.
However, such examples are not necessarily representative, for a number of reasons. They are drawn from elections of a single year, 1966;
they are taken from comparatively small states; and the figures for North
Carolina and Minnesota are distorted by uncontested districts. Even
Kansas and Oregon might have come out as they did whether there was
gerrymandering or not; the samples of five and four seats in one election are too small to be free of the vagaries of their political surroundings. One of Minnesota's eight districts and two of North Carolina's
eleven districts had unopposed candidates; the figures given here are
based on the unrealistic assumption that the unopposed party had
"won" 100 per cent of the votes in the district. In states like Texas,
where 13 of 23 candidates ran unopposed in 1966, it is not possible to
do anything but guess the political impact of gerrymanders-a serious
obstacle to overall assessment, because such states are probably more
thoroughly gerrymandered than states where the districts are all contested.
A good sample, however, must be tolerably commensurable with its
universe, and large enough to be representative. It would have to exclude cases where more than one or two seats were uncontested, and
it would have to cancel out the vagaries of local and temporary factors
either by covering several elections or by confining itself to large states,
whose many districts would tend to cancel out local factors. A large
sample of elections will not be available until more elections have been
held; i.e., in the 1970's. However, it is still possible to examine the
experience of large, widely contested states, in the congressional elections of 1966 and 1968, and these suggest that parties with districting
power have used it to their own advantage with devastating effect.
The fate of the Republicans in California and Pennsylvania in 1966,
who respectively won 44.7 and 48 per cent of the seats with 51.8 per
cent and 51.5 per cent of the votes, stands in sharp contrast with that
of the Democrats in Missouri in 1966, who won 80 per cent of the seats
with only 55.9 per cent of the votes. Table One suggests that in the
large states the districting power conferred on its possessor an advantage
of 18.8 per cent extra seats in the 1966 and 1968 elections-larger than
the average of 11 to 17 per cent extra seats which Robert Sickels found
for the elections from 1946 to 1964.52
52 Note, however, that the basis of the 18.8 figure for the 1966 and 1968 elections is
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TABLE ONE
VOTES CASr AND SEATS WON IN LARGE CONTESTED STATES,1
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

State/
Election Year

Districting
Date

Winner controlled
Ind. 68
Mich. 66
Mo. 66
Mo. 68
N. J. 66
N. J. 68
Ohio 66
Ohio 68
Pa. 68
Wis. 66
Wis. 68

districting.
19683
1964
1965
1967
1966
1967/685
1964
1968
1966
1963
1963

or 1966

AND

1968

Number
Districts

Votes Won

Seats Won

Bonus

(%)2

(%)

(%)

11
19
10
10
15
15
24
24
27
10
10

53.2 (53.7)R
50.0 (49.8)R
55.9 (53.6)D
56.9 (56.0)D
50.0 (50.5)R
52.9 (49.2)D
57.14(56.1)R
60.3 (60.8)R
51.9 (53.5)D
52.7 (53.8)R
53.8 (54.4)R

63.6
63.2
80.0
90.0
60.0
60.0
79.2
75.0
51.9
70.0
70.0

10A (9.9)
13.2 (13.4)
24.1 (26.4)
83.1 (34.0)
10.0 ( 9.5)
7.1 (11.8)
22.1 (23.1)
14.7 (14.2)
0.0(-1.6)
17.3 (16.2)
16.2 (15.6)

Average bonus: 14.7 (17.1)
Winner did not control districting:
Calif. 66
1961
38
Calif. 68
1968
88
III. 66
19653
24
II. 68
1965
24
Ind. 66
1965
11
Mich. 68
1964
19
N. Y. 66
1961
41
N. Y. 68
1968
41
Pa. 66
1966
27

51.8
52.9
53.3
51.5
56.8
52.3
56.1
55.6
51.5

(58.3)R
(55.0)R
(54.2)R
(53.6)R
(53.5)R
(49.1)R
(52.5)D
(52.3)D
(495)R

44.7
44.7
50.0
50.0
54.5
36.8
63.4
61.0
48.1

-7.1
-8.2
-3.3
-1.5
-2.3
-15.5
7.3
5.4
-3.4

( -8.6)
(-10.3)

(-4.2)
(-3.6)
( 1.0)
(-12.3)
( 10.9)
( 8.7)
( -1.4)

Average bonus: -4.1 ( -2.2)
(18.8%) (19.3%)
Average extra margin from districting control: 18.8% of seats (19.3%).
1 Excludes all states with less than ten districts or more than one district unopposed.
Percentage is of two-party vote, computed by adding and averaging the percentages in
each district. Figures in parentheses are computed by adding the actual votes won by each
party.
3 Indiana and Illinois were districted by federal courts with 2-1 partisan majorities.
4 One candidate was unopposed and is credited with 100% support in his district.
5 New Jersey was redistricted by the Democrats in 1967; the Republicans altered two
of the 15 districts for the 1968 elections.
2

not commensurable with Sickels' basis for the 1946-64 elections. Sickels excluded all
elections where any district was uncontested and all elections where one party won
more than 55% of the popular vote; his mean margin of advantage for all contested
elections in all states was 11.8%, median margin, 17.0%. For states of ten or more districts,
all districts contested, the mean margin of advantage was 16.9%, median, 14.5%. SickeIs,
supra note 27, at 1802-3. If Ohio, Missouri, New York, and Indiana in 1966 were excluded
from the elections in Table One, thereby making every district in the remaining states
contested, the basis of the margin of advantage in the large states would be the same
as Sickels', but the resulting 1966 and 1968 mean margin-17.1%-would still be a hair
larger than that of the earlier elections-16.9%.
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Table One includes only ten of the large states with contested
districts; however, these ten states comprise half the seats in Congress,
219 out of 435. Another six states with ten or more districts, but with
3
more than one district uncontested, account for another 75 seats;r
states with nine districts or less comprise the remaining 141 seats.
Perhaps time and a detailed examination of elections for state legislatures will give firmer ground for assessing the gerrymandering consequences of reapportionment, but it is safe to say that party cartographers were never so busy as they have been since reapportionment, 4
and the little firm evidence we have suggests very strongly that they
redrew the new districts to party specifications.
IV. EFFEcr ON PARTY AND NEGRO POwER

The concurrence of the Gerrymandering Revolution with the Reapportionment Revolution has tempered earlier predictions that reapportionment would increase Republican and Negro representation by
favoring cities in the South and suburbs across the nation. Preliminary
investigations by Andrew Hacker, the Republican National Committee,
and the Legislative Reference Service concluded that Republicans and
Negroes stood to gain from reapportionment, which would give more
votes to their strongholds in southern cities and to suburbs across the
nation where Republicans were strongest, provided districts were drawn
at random.55 However, except in some of the minority of states with
non-legislative redistricting, 56 it has not been the tradition to redistrict
53 These states are: Florida (12 seats); Georgia (10); Massachusetts (12); North
Carolina (11); Texas (20); and Virginia (10).
54 All the states but Oregon have had some kind of redistricting since Baker v. Carr.
Some states have gone through repeated redistricting as parties struggled to replace each
other's gerrymanders with their own. Thus, Missouri redistricted in 1961, 1965, and 1967;
New Jersey in 1961, 1966, and 1968, with each redistricting battle diverting the legislators'
attention from more substantive matters.
55 CONG. Q. CENsUs ANALYsIs 1786 (Aug. 21, 1964); U.S. LmaRAY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE SERvICE, RECENT SUPREME COURT DEcisIoNs ON APPORTIONMENT:

THEnt

POLITICAL

IMPACT 11-12, 22-28 (1964).

56 Only six states-Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Missouri, and Ohio-had nonlegislative reapportionment in 1962; seven others-California, Illinois, Michigan, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Texas-provided for nonlegislative apportionment
if the legislature failed to act within a specified time. Seven states-Alaska, Arkansas,
Hawaii, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas-provided for court review of apportionment plans. ADVISORY CO?,IMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, APPORTIONMENT
oF STATE LEGISLATuRES 21-22 (1962).
See CQ at 48-50 for a description of the three-year fight in Illinois over which "nonpartisan" body-the United States District Court in Chicago (with two Democratic
judges and one Republican), or the State Supreme Court (Republican, 5-2), or the senate
redistricting commission--should redistrict. Most of the issues were eventually settled by
compromise between the parties themselves. Three-judge federal courts in Indiana
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at random, but to redistrict to the advantage of whoever conducted the
redistricting, which may explain Senator Dirksen's interest in stopping
it. The Reapportionment Revolution took place at a particularly bad
time for the Republicans; namely, after the elections of 1964, which
had cost the Republicans 101 seats in state senates and 426 seats in
state houses of representatives. Only a handful of states had reapportioned in time for the 1964 elections; 57 89 states reapportioned in 1965
and 1966 when the Democrats controlled both houses in 32 states, the
Republicans in only six, with control split in eight states.58 "The result,"
concluded the Congressional Quarterly, in 1966, "may be a built-in
Democratic advantage... for years to come."5 9 The 1966 California
elections, where the Democrats retained majorities in both houses and
in the state's delegation of United States Congressmen though outpolled
by the Republicans by substantial margins in all three elections,60
show how reapportionment, combined with gerrymandering, took away
in practice the equal representation it purported to convey on paper.
Although Negroes probably gained overall from reapportionment in
the South, they also suffered no less than other local minorities from
constitutionally decent burial in multi-member districts, which shared
in the general efflorescence of discriminatory districting. Georgia, Virginia, and Tennessee Negroes found their hopes of electing Negro
delegates swallowed in part by the mapmaker's dragon, but they appealed in vain to the Supreme Court and state courts, whose rulemaking
resources were not equal to dealing with such tasks.61 Other minorities
were likewise buried without hope of judicial rescue,62 though in most
and Missouri dutifully rendered judgments in 1967-68 redistricting cases in strict accord
with the party background of the judges. Republicans called for a Congressional investigation when District Court Judge John W. Oliver, a long-time Democrat, consulted with
Democratic Governor Warren E. Hearnes prior to rendering the Court's decision. 26
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 488 (Mar. 8, 1968).
57 Note, Reapportionment, 79 HAv. L. Rxv. 1226, 1239 (1966); CQ at 68-69.
58 CQ at 59, 69. The Republicans had lost control of both houses in six states, one
house in another seven states.
59 Id. at 44.
60 See Anderson and Lee, The 1966 Election in California,20 WESrERN POL. Q. 535, 551
(1967). The effect of the California gerrymandering was to create so many safe seats
that California politics are more and more centered in party primaries, as in the South.
"In all three chambers-Senate, Assembly, and House of Representatives-well over half
the seats are so heavily registered for one party or the other that general election
competition offers little promise of success." Id.
61 Lucas, Of Ducks and Drakes: Judicial Relief in Reapportionment Cases, 38 NoTaR
DAm LAw. 401 (1963).
62 See, e.g., Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Burnette v. Davis, 882 U.S. 42
(1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310
(M.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 40 (1964); CQ at 25. But see Fairley v.
Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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cases the discriminatory districts had been created under the judicially
sponsored pressure of reapportionment.
Unlike its pre-reapportionment forebears, the New Breed of gerrymander and multi-member district cannot be expected to weaken with
time and population changes in fulfilling its discriminatory function,
for the districts must be redrawn according to the Fundamental Principle at least once every ten years in a fresh Reapportionment Revolution whose equal districts can be expected to discriminate in favor of
those holding power in the early 1970's and 1980's as they now discriminate in favor of those who hold power in 1965 and 1966.8 The
Reapportionment Revolution appears to have brought with it more
and better gerrymanders, and it can be expected to go on doing so in
the future as long as the district system is there to provide the motivation to keep discrimination up-to-date.
V.

"NONPARTISAN"

DISMICTING

A theoretical countermeasure to gerrymandering short of proportional representation is the bureaucratic alternative: nonpartisan districting. This has been used with success in a few states6 but has not
been popular in state legislatures because it delegates a function of
supreme importance to the legislators for its heavy bearing on their
continuance in office. Such matters are deemed too important to entrust to functionaries. Courts could treat this problem in one of two
ways, neither of which is very satisfactory: they could treat legislative
redistricting as "inherently unequal," a reasonable assumption in most
cases where one party or group controls the legislature, but with highly
disruptive implications if extended to other acts of the same legislature
which are likewise partisan and expected to be so; alternatively, courts
could draw their own districts, a practice which they have hitherto
tried to avoid because of the political sensitivity of the task. These
bureaucratic judicial alternatives raise two further considerations: the
immediate recognition that courts and commissions are not necessarily
nonpartisan,6 5 and the larger question of whether commitment of a
problem to nonrepresentative bodies can be properly regarded as a
revitalization of representative government.
The reapportionment cases have revitalized representative government only in the sense that amputating someone's leg and replacing it
with a wooden leg "revitalizes" the leg; the Court's logic of inter63 Or produce a disruptive redistricting with every change in party ascendancy at the
polls.
64 See note 56 supra.
65 See second paragraph, note 56 sura.
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vention started from the assumption that the states' existing institutions
were not worth saving (except in Oregon, the one state that met the
Court's standards before 1962). The Court in Baker v. Car0 6 discarded
67
the alternative of nonintervention; in the Reapportionment Cases
it discarded the alternative of selective intervention, of attempting to
distinguish between states like Alabama which needed wooden legs
and states like Colorado that did not. Reapportionists have argued that
every state needs equal districts, essentially because they are more equal
than unequal ones, but such arguments assume their own conclusion;
they prove, in effect, that every state needs wooden legs because they are
more wooden than any other kind. The Supreme Court has bought this
logic, why and at what cost or profit to itself I have examined elsewhere, 68 but the cost to representative government in the states, while
it cannot be measured, seems in most cases very high. Equal districts
have chopped up some communities and stuck the pieces onto others;
unqualified by any attempt to consider more subtle forms of structural
bias like bloc voting, strategic majorities, multi-member districts, and
gerrymanders, they can and have aggravated such biases by taking away
the most workable form of counter balance; they often jar with geographical needs; if strictly applied at the local level they can discourage
attempts to settle local problems through representative channels; radical district changes are enormously disruptive to other forms ol
legislation and highly productive of gerrymanders and discriminatory
multi-member districts; and imposing a rigid rule on people who do
not want it, 69 however dressed up with democratic rhetoric, is not
democratic. Arthur Sutherland has expressed as well as anyone the
rationale for entrusting the Justices with powers not given to other
men: they are supposed to be educated, experienced, practical men.
To make inevitable distinctions between a time for judicial
66 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

67 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
68 W. ELLIOTT, VOTING RIGITS AND THE GUARDIAN ETHIc: SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION IN

VOTING RIGHTs DISPUTES FROM TANEY TO WARREN, ch. 7 (to be published).
69 In Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) the Court overruled
a 2-1 popular majority opposed to equal districts in the Colorado Senate, and Colorado
was not an isolated case. More often than not, the public matched or surpassed their
elected representatives' hostility to reapportionment. Initiative proposals favoring urban
voters in several urban states-Michigan 1924, 1930, 1932, 1952; Colorado and Washington,
1962; California, 1926, 1928, 1948, 1960, 1962-were resoundingly defeated amid grumblings
by political scientists that "citizens should be given the blessings of equality whether they

want them or not."
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action and a time for judicial self-restraint, few sources of
guidance can be as satisfactory as the disciplined prepossessions
of an independent judge, aware of history, tolerant of the

democratic process, and conscious of human limitations. 70
But this rationale is good only as long as the Justices do not bungle.
In the reapportionment cases, the majority's awareness of history took
the form of wholesale fabrication; they "tolerated" the democratic
process by overruling it; and their consciousness of human limitations
did not stop them from imposing their own distorted and incomplete
version of representative government upon the states. The Reapportionment Revolution does represent a triumph of administrative policy in
the sense that it had fitted almost every state with wooden legs in the
space of only a few years, but it is a triumph of Equal Representation
for Equal Numbers only if you like wooden legs-and that must be
regarded (as Andrew Hacker told us in 1965) as a question of aesthetics.
70 Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HAIv. L. REv. 25, 40 (1962).

